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Optimal Sentences for White-Collar Criminals
RICHARD A. POSNER*

Those concerned by the growth of white-collar crime disagree over
the choice of a fine or imprisonment as the more appropriate
sentence. In this article, Professor Posner argues that a sufficiently
large fine is an equally effective deterrent that is cheaper to
administer and therefore socially preferable.
I have agreed to participate in this symposium because it gives me an
opportunity to argue a favorite plank in the economist's platform for
reforming the legal system, in a context in which the economic position can be
simply but persuasively stated without elaborate argument and evidence. The
plank is the substitution, whenever possible, of the fine (or civil penalty) for
the prison sentence as the punishment for crime; the appealing context in
which to argue the case for such substitution is the punishment of the white
collar criminal.
The coiner of the term "white collar crime" defined it "as a crime
committed by a person of respectability and high social status in the course of
his occupation,"' but this is not a good definition. The terms "respectability"
and "high social status" are ambiguous, and the definition arbitrarily
excludes certain white-collar crimes, such as evasion of the personal income
tax, which are not committed in the course of one's occupation. More
important, it is not an apt definition from the standpoint of sentencing policy,
which is the focus of this article.
I shall instead, for reasons that I hope will soon become clear, use the term
white-collar crime to refer to the nonviolent crimes typically committed by
either (1) well-to-do individuals or (2) associations, such as business corporations and labor unions, which are generally "well-to-do" compared to the
common criminal. White-collar crime in the sense I use it is illustrated by the
criminal offenses created by the securities laws, the labor laws, the antitrust
laws, other regulatory statutes, and the income-tax laws. But not every
offender under such laws is a white-collar criminal as I use the term. A
waitress, for example, could commit a criminal violation of the tax laws by
not reporting her tips as income; but because, as we shall see, the affluence of
the offender is very important to the correct punishment for the offense, I
would not describe her offense as a white-collar crime. Nor would a murder
committed by a wealthy person-or by a criminal gang seeking to monopolize
* Lee and Brena Freeman Professor of Law, University of Chicago. B.A. 1959, Yale University; LL.B.
1962, Harvard University.
1.E. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME 9 (1961). See also H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE
CRIMINAL SANCTION 534 (1968). The term "white collar crime" is, of course, "not subject to any one clear
definition." Edelhertz, The Nature, Impact and Prosecution of White Collar Crime, in WHITE COLLAR
CRIMES: DEFENSE AND PROSECUTION 15,16 (B. George, Jr. ed. 1971). Edelhertz argues that Sutherland's
definition is too restrictive, and proposes the following: "an illegal act or series of illegal acts committed by
nonphysical means and by concealment or guile, to obtain money or property, to avoid the payment or loss
of money or property, or to obtain business or personal advantage." Id. at 16-17. Surely this is too
broad-it includes, for example, espionage.
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the garbage-collection business of a city, for example-be a white-collar
crime; the reason, as again we shall see, is that the proper punishment for a
crime of violence raises special questions. To summarize, white-collar crimes
are those more likely to be committed by the affluent than by the poor
criminal-crimes that involve fraud, monopoly, and breach of faith rather
than violence. The white-collar criminal is the affluent perpetrator of those
crimes.
The point I wish to argue in this article, an application of the economic
analysis of crime and punishment pioneered by Gary Becker, 2 can now be
stated simply: the white-collar criminal as I have defined him should be
punished only by monetary penalties-by fines (where civil damages or
penalties are inadequate or inappropriate) 3 rather than by imprisonment or
other "afflictive" punishments (save as they may be necessary to coerce
payment of the monetary penalty). In a social cost-benefit analysis of the
choice between fining and imprisoning the white-collar criminal, the cost side
of the analysis favors fining because, as we shall see, the cost of collecting a
fine from one who can pay it (an important qualification) is lower than the
cost of imprisonment. On the benefit side, there is no difference in principle
between the sanctions. The fine for a white-collar crime can be set at whatever
level imposes the same disutility on the defendant, and thus yield the same
deterrence, as the prison sentence that would have been imposed instead.
Hence, fining the affluent offender is preferable to imprisoning him from
society's standpoint because it is less costly and no less efficacious.
The reason that the fine is the cheaper sanction is that, unlike imprisonment, it is a transfer payment. Because the dollars collected from the criminal
as a fine show up on the benefit side of the social ledger, the net social cost is
limited to the costs of collecting the fine. 4 A term of imprisonment, on the
other hand, yields no comparable social revenue if we disregard the negligible,
and nowadays usually zero, output of the prisoner. On the contrary, to the
social costs of imprisonment must be added the considerable sums spent on
maintaining prisoners. To be sure, for a middle-class offender, a short prison
term might be the deterrent equivalent of a large fine. But it would not follow
that the social costs of the short prison term were correspondingly low,
because the greater one's income, the greater is the cost of imprisonment in
lost earnings. As long as these are earnings in legitimate occupations, their
loss is a social cost similar to the cost of the prison guards. The large fine
avoids these costs.
I anticipate relatively little disagreement with the proposition that fines are
cheaper to society than imprisonment when the offender can pay the fine. I
expect great resistance, however, to the proposition that the social benefits of
2. See Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968); for a
nontechnical discussion, see R. POSNER, ECONOMic ANALYSIS OF LAW 164-72 (2d ed. 1977). Becker
argues that the use of fines as punishment minimizes the social loss resulting from crime.
3. See text accompanying notes 24-27 infra.
4. The equation is imprecise because it fails to measure completely the disutility to the offender. If a
defendant is risk averse-and assuming (realistically) that the probability of apprehension and conviction is
less than one-a fine will impose greater disutility on offenders than the dollar amount of the fine, so that
the transfer payment is less than the cost of the punishment. See Polinsky & Shavell, The Optimal Trade-off
Between Probability and Magnitude of Fines, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 880 (1979). But the principle asserted
in the text still holds, for in the case of imprisonment there is no transfer payment at all and it is therefore
always more costly if the offender can pay the fine.
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punishment are no greater when punishment takes the form of imprisonment
than when it takes the form of a fine. It will be argued that there is no money
equivalent to the pain of imprisonment, perhaps especially to the affluent,
educated, "sensitive" person-the white-collar criminal-that would be
within his power to pay. (The offender here is necessarily an individual: a
corporation or other "artificial" person cannot, of course, be punished by
imprisonment.) But whether this is so depends, in a theoretical analysis, on
the gravity of the crime in relation to the probability of apprehension and
conviction, 5 and, in a practical analysis, on the severity of the prison sentences
actually imposed for white-collar crimes. As to the first, it is no doubt true
that very few people would consider a fine of any size to be as severe a
punishment as death, or imprisonment for life, or, perhaps, imprisonment for
twenty years. Thus, if these are optimal punishments (putting aside the
consideration that imprisonment is more costly to administer), it might
indeed be difficult to find a monetary equivalent. Perhaps these are optimal
punishments for some white-collar crimes. If so, my proposal to substitute
fines for prison for white-collar criminals is in serious difficulty-but only in a
rather academic sense. For whatever may be theoretically optimal, whitecollar criminals, at least in this country, are not punished by death or long
prison terms. Table 1 provides some data on the type and length of sentences
for various federal crimes. 6 With the (surprising) exception of securities
offenses, the prison sentences for white-collar crimes-when prison sentences
are imposed on the perpetrators of such crimes 7-barely exceed two years.
Even this figure greatly exaggerates the actual time served behind bars, which
is shortened by parole and time off for good behavior.
Perhaps, as I have suggested, these prison terms are too short given the
gravity of the crimes and the difficulty of detecting them. That is a large
question that I do not propose to investigate here. I shall instead treat the
existing level of imprisonment for white-collar crime as part of the background of the analysis. Given that level, it is highly improbable that there is
no fine equivalent to a prison sentence in the amount of disutility it imposes
on the offender. An individual who has the boldness, the effrontery, to
commit a crime-even of the white-collar variety-will have the capacity and
inclination to consider realistic trade-offs between 90 days, or even a year or
two, in one of the federal system's minimal security prisons and a hefty fine. If
he would be deterred by the threat of such a prison sentence, he would be
equally deterred by the threat of a $50,000 or $100,000 or $250,000 fine. (And
fines could be indexed to prevent inflation from reducing their bite.)
5. See Becker, supra note 2, at 191-92. For further economic analysis of optimal punishment, see
Ehrlich, Participationin Illegal Activities: An Economic Analysis, in ESSAYS IN THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME

AND PUNISHMENT 68 (G. Becker & W. Landes ed. 1974); Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Criminal Law
Enforcement, I J. LEGAL STUD. 259 (1972).
6. Homicide and robbery are not white-collar crimes; they are included for the sake of comparison.
Embezzlement is a mixed case-as indeed are virtually all of the other categories-because it fails to
differentiate between the affluent and nonaffluent offender. As I have argued in the text, if a waitress
evades federal income tax it might be optimal to imprison rather than fine her because the optimal fine
(optimal in light not only of the amount evaded but also of the difficulty of detecting such evasions) might
exceed her ability to pay.
7. The difference in Table I between the number imprisoned and fined and the total number sentenced is
the number placed on probation.
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Table I

TYPE AND LENGTH OF FEDERAL PRISON SENTENCES, 1976

Total Ders
Sentenced

Number
Imprisoned

Average
Sentence of
Imprisonment
(months)

40,112
108
2.286
1,650

18,478
84
2,031
289

47.2
125.1
134.3
22.4

3,198
0
0
14

Fraud, total
Income Tax
Lending Institutions
Postal
Securities and Exchange

3,691
1,157
390
938
86

1,234
340
121
404
40

22.7
15.4
18.4
31.1
45.7

222
68
12
37
12

Federal Statutes, total
Antitrust
Food and Drug Act
Customs Laws
Motor Carrier Act
Agricultural Acts
Migratory Bird Laws

4,208
175
103
182
105
459
894

565
I
6
36
0
3.7
17

29.7
Not shown
Not shown
19.9
Not shown
20.0
Not shown

1.501
137
78
34
97
203
621

Postal (other than fraud.
obscenity, and
embezzlement)

1,003

150

7.6

32

Nature of the Offense

Total
Homicide, total
Robbery, total
Embezzlement, total

Source:

Number
Fined
Only

1977 Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics at pp. 552-53 (Table 5.22).

It should be noted also that the affluent offender presents interesting
opportunities for society to exercise its ingenuity in the collection of fines. For
example, a penalty that takes the form of barring the defendant from pursuing

his occupation-a penalty frequently used by the SEC in dealing with
securitites fraud and by state authorities in dealing with misconduct by
lawyers-is the equivalent of a fine. The amount of the "fine" is simply the
difference between the defendant's future income in the occupation from
which he is barred and the income in his best alternative occupation,
discounted to present value. This device offers a means of collecting a large
fine from an individual who has a large earning capacity but little wealth. An
alternative possibility is the collection of a large fine in periodic installments.
The availability of these devices enables one to contemplate realistically the
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possibility of levying very large fines in lieu ot the present prison sentences for
white-collar crimes.
If it is objected that the schedule of prison-fine equivalences cannot in fact
be calculated, there are two replies. The first is that a nice calculation is not
required; the prison sentences imposed in white-collar cases--or in any other
cases for that matter-are not themselves the product of any nice calculation
of the amount of disutility imposed by the sentence on the offender, but are
only the roughest of guesses. The second and more interesting reply is that
there are in fact methods, imperfect ones to be sure, of empirically tracing out
the curve of indifference between fine and imprisonment. One incomplete
method would be to calculate directly the costs of imprisonment to the
prisoner (primarily in terms of income foregone by him); the other and, I
think, more promising method would be to infer statistically the relative
deterrent effect of fine and prison. Suppose that in one federal district the
average fine for a federal white-collar offense is $1,000 and the average prison
term 30 days, and in another district it is $800 and 40 days, and so forth.
Then, by comparing the incidence of the offenses across districts, we should
be able to infer the rate of exchange at which days in jail translate into dollars
of fine with no loss of deterrence. (A study of state white-collar prosecutions,
conducted along similar lines, might also be feasible.) Since no such study has
been attempted, I cannot evaluate the difficulties it might encounter arising,
for example, because the incidence of many white-collar crimes (e.g., pricefixing conspiracies) is unknown, or the gravity of the crime may vary across
districts or states, which affects the optimal sentence. 8 Such a study might not
produce results entitled to great confidence. Nevertheless, supplemented by
the intuition that guides judges today in devising fine-prison "packages" to
impose on white-collar offenders, such a study should provide a close enough
approximation of the actual fine-prison trade-off that we need not fear that by
substituting fines for prison sentences in white-collar cases we would be
drastically altering the expected punishment cost, and hence the level, of
white-collar crime. The substitution could, of course, be made incrementally,
one offense at a time, starting with the least important.
Professor Coffee, in his contribution to this symposium, offers three
reasons why the threat of imprisonment is inherently greater than that of a
fine. 9 One is that the optimal fine may exceed the offender's ability to pay. t 0
While this is certainly possible, it is no reason to prefer imprisonment to fines
in cases where offenders can pay the fines. All I am arguing in this paper is
that fines are preferable to imprisonment where the fines are collectible.

8. Perhaps this problem could be solved by standardizing for income, which might be a reasonable proxy
for the expected gains from the crime.
9. See Coffee, Corporate Crime and Punishment: A Non-Chicago View of the Economics of Criminal
Sanctions, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 419 (1980).
10. Id. at 434-36.
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Second, Coffee, following Block and Lind,II argues that in order to be sure
that an offender will pay whatever fine is levied, he must be threatened with a
prison sentence that is more severe than the fine. If there is no difference in
severity, the offender will be indifferent between the two forms of punishment. This point is correct but does not support Coffee's position. The
purpose of imprisonment in Block and Lind's analysis is not to deter the
offender but to coerce collection of the fine. The very premise of their
proposal is thus the superior economic efficiency of fines to imprisonment as a
method of punishment.
Third, Coffee erects an elaborate argument on Block and Lind's further
point that offenders are risk preferrers with regard to imprisonment even if
they are risk averters with regard to fines. 12 Coffee compares two probability
distributions of punishment having the same mean, one a distribution of
prison sentences and the other a distribution of fines, and argues that the
latter distribution will be wider (i.e. more dispersed) because there is less
difference among individuals in the disutility of imprisonment than in the
disutility of fines. Coffee argues that, because the offender is a risk preferrer
with regard to imprisonment, the relatively narrow dispersion of the probability distribution of imprisonment will make imprisonment a less attractive
form of punishment than its fine equivalent. Of course, if people are risk
averse with regard to fines, as Coffee himself had argued initially in his
paper, 13 the greater dispersion of the probability distribution of fines would
have a deterrent effect symmetrical to that of the narrower dispersion of the
probability distribution of imprisonment. Yet Coffee retracts his earlier point
and argues that offenders will also be risk preferring with regard to the fine
distribution, because the opportunities to conceal assets are greater at the high
end of the distribution. Therefore, he concludes, the narrower dispersion of
the probability distribution of imprisonment is unequivocally less attractive to
offenders.
Every step in Coffee's complicated argument can be questioned, but it is
unnecessary to do so because the argument leads nowhere. If it is true, for
whatever reason, that imprisonment is unpleasant relative to fines-because
of a "stigma" effect, 14 or because prison guards are brutal, or because
imprisonment interferes with an offender's predilection for taking risks more
than fines do-this affects simply the exchange rate between dollars of fine
and days of imprisonment and not the choice of which method of punishment
to use. If we think that the term of imprisonment for a crime provides the
correct amount of deterrence, then in computing the fine equivalent we will
want to be sure that we take account of all of the factors that make
imprisonment a source of disutility. The fine equivalent is still the cheaper
punishment method, however, as long as the fine can be collected from the
offender.
I turn now to what seems a separate, but is really the same, objection to
substituting fines for imprisonment in white-collar crimes: namely, that a
11.

Id. at 473-77; see Block & Lind, Crime and Punishment Reconsidered, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 241, 244

(1975).

12. Coffee, supra note 9, at 430-33; see Block & Lind, An Economic Analysis of Crimes Punishable by
Imprisonment, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 479, 481 (1975).
13. See Coffee, supra note 9, at 430.
14. See text accompanying notes 23-26 infra.
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system in which poor offenders were usually imprisoned and rich offenders
usually fined would be a system that discriminated against poor people.15 This
argument is just a variant of the fallacy that imprisonment is inherently more
punitive than fines. It gains some plausibility only from the ridiculous "rates
of exchange" that used to be commonplace in crimes where the criminal had
the option of paying a fine or going to jail, a practice that has been invalidated
by the Supreme Court under the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 16 The assumption behind this argument, however, is false. For
every prison sentence there is some fine equivalent; if the fine is so large that it
cannot be collected, then the offender should be imprisoned. How then are the
rich favored under such a system?
A possible answer is that the rich could "buy" more crime under a fine
system than under an imprisonment system. Suppose that the expected cost to
society of a crime is $100, the probability of apprehension and conviction is 10
percent, and therefore the fine is set at $1,000 so that expected punishment
cost will be equal to the expected social cost. A rich man would not be
deterred from committing this crime as long as the expected benefits to him
were greater than $1000. But now suppose that instead of a fine of $1000, a
prison term of one month is imposed for this crime based on a study which
shows that the disutility of a month in prison to an average person is $1,000.
Since the disutility of imprisonment rises with income, this form of punishment will deter the rich man more than the poor one. Stated differently, a
nominally uniform prison term has the effect of price discrimination based on
income.
But this is not to say that a system of fines discriminates against the poor. It
is rather that a uniform prison term discriminates against the rich compared
with a uniform fine. If we want to discriminate against the rich through a fine
system, that is easily done by progressively varying the fine with the
offender's income.' 7 If we want not to discriminate against the rich through
an imprisonment system, we can make the length of the sentence inverse to
the offender's income.18 In either case the choice to discriminate is independent of the form of the punishment.19
15. The argument is made by Coffee, supra note 9, at 446-49.
16. The practice has been invalidated in those cases in which the defendant's indigency is a determining
factor in his imprisonment. See Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971) (inability to pay fine resulting from
traffic offense cannot justify imprisonment if affluent offender not subject to possible imprisonment);
Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970) (defendant sentenced to fine and imprisonment may not be
imprisoned for period greater than statutory maximum because of his inability to pay the fine). In
Williams, the choice was a $500 fine or 100 days in jail. Putting aside all other costs to the individual of
imprisonment, and ignoring taxes, someone who earned $5 a day was better off paying the fine than going
to prison, and for an affluent offender there was no semblance of equivalence between the fine and the
prison sentence. To take another example (though one not involving a choice by the offender and hence not
implicating the constitutional issue decided in Tate and Williams), the Sherman Act until 1955 provided a
maximum prison sentence of one year in jail and a maximum fine of only $5,000. Sherman Act, ch. 647.
§ 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended by Act of July 7, 1955. ch. 281, 69 Stat. 282 (substituting $50,000 for
$5,000). Today, these maxima are three years and S100,000, a more reasonable rate of exchange though
still one unduly favorable to the fine. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
17. Varying the amount of the fine with the offender's income was first suggested by Jeremy Bentham. J.
BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LrTGATION 217 (Baxi ed., R. Hildreth trans. 1975) ("Pecuniary punishments
should always be regulated by the fortune of the offender. The relative amount of the fine should be fixed,
not its absolute amount ....
").
18. See Becker, supra note 2, at 195.
19. Whether we want to discriminate against the rich in the penal system depends basically on whether

HeinOnline -- 17 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 415 1979-1980

AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17:409

Professor Coffee is of course not alone in disregarding the "equivalence
principle" developed above. It is commonly disregarded both in discussions of
punishment for white-collar criminals, and in the assumption that only the
threat of imprisonment will deter white-collar crime. 20 For examplej a survey
of merchants "revealed that they considered imprisonment [for black market
violations] a far more effective penalty than any other government action,
including fines."' 2 1 Findings like these have led some criminologists to
consider imprisonment and fines incommensurable sanctions. Yet in the same
analysis we read that a company found to have committed black market
violations involving 300,000 pounds of meat in a five-month period received a
total fine of $1,500; the profit from the violations seems to have been at least
$25,000.22

. Where fines are trivial, it is natural to suppose that only substantial jail
sentences will carry a "stigma" effect which adds to deterrence. Yet even if,
improbably, imprisonment produced a stigma effect which no magnitude of
fine could duplicate, only the rate of exchange between fine and imprisonment, and not the principle of equivalence, would be affected. The fine
equivalent would then be higher than if a fine carried a stigma as well. But, in
fact, the presence of stigma is an argument for fines rather than for prison
sentences. Most students of the criminal process locate the source of the
stigma in the fact of conviction rather than the form of the sentence. 23 The
more punishment society obtains simply from the stigmatizing effect of
conviction, the smaller the fine that must be imposed to produce the optimal
severity of punishment; and the smaller the fine, the less likely it is to exceed
the white-collar criminal's ability to pay.
The existence of a stigma of conviction 24 bears on the question, why, if a
money sanction is adequate, is criminal punishment necessary at all? Why not
rely entirely on money damages, as in a civil action? If the stigma arises either
because the action is brought by the state and denominated as criminal, or
because the higher standard of proof for criminal cases makes it less likely
that a convicted defendant is really innocent, then it would be lost if civil
penalties were substituted for criminal fines. Of course, the latter aspect of the
stigma effect could be preserved simply by increasing the standard of proof in
a civil penalty suit to the criminal level.
the optimal incidence of the criminal activity, costs of enforcement aside, is zero or greater than zero. If it is
zero, then one possible system of punishment would be to levy a fine equal to the offender's total wealth.
This, of course, may be viewed as discrimination against the rich because the fine would increase with the
offender's wealth. If, however, the criminal activity is not totally devoid of social utility, so that its optimal
incidence is not zero, then the object of punishment is not to deter as such but to make the offender
internalize the social costs of his activity, and the case for discrimination is no longer established. For in
this case we do not want to deprive society of the utility obtained from the criminal's act, but only to make
sure that he pays the costs he imposes on others. See R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 166. Some would argue, of
course, that the rich should be punished more severely than the poor in order to make the distribution of
wealth more equal .Whatever the merits of greater equality of income in general, the criminal justice system

seems a haphazard and inefficient device for redistributing income and wealth.
20. See. e.g., Geis, Criminal Penalties for Corporate Criminals, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 377 (1972).
21. M. CLINARD, THE BLACK MARKET-A STUDY OF WHITE COLLAR CRIME 244 (1969).

22. Id.
23. See, e.g.. Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 401 (1958).
24. This stigma may be especially pronounced in the case of this "sensitive" white-collar criminal as
contrasted with the rough, uneducated, and "insensitive" street criminal.
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I am not entirely happy with this answer, however, and not only because I
think the stigma or moral revulsion that attaches to certain conduct does so
because of the nature of the conduct rather than the fact that it is labeled
criminal or proceeded against by the criminal process. 25 The economic
objection to relying on stigma for deterrence is that, like imprisonment, it is
more costly to society than the pure fine (or civil penalty) because it does not
yield any revenue. (Stigma, unlike a fine, imposes costs on the criminal with
no corresponding gain to society.) Hence, it would seem more efficient to
drop the criminal label, and any stigma attached to it, and offset any loss in
disutility to the criminal by increasing the size of the civil penalty. In that
way, the social revenue can be increased with no loss of deterrence.
In fact a good deal of punishment is meted out in civil penalty suits. The
example with which I am most familiar is the treble-damage action in
antitrust cases, in which two-thirds of every damage award is in effect a
fine-often a much higher one than the statutory maximum for a criminal
antitrust suit-albeit the fine is paid to the plaintiff rather than to the state. I
am inclined to think that the civil penalty is superior to the criminal fine as a
method of punishing white-collar criminals. Whether the penalty should be
paid to a private plaintiff or to the state, however, should depend on the
relative efficiency of private26and public enforcement in particular contexts, an
issue discussed elsewhere.
But I am straying into the question of decriminalization. My subject is the
sentencing of white-collar criminals, which assumes that some white-collar
offenses should, or at least will, continue to be dealt with by the criminal
process. If the criminal sanction is to be retained in this area, then, as I have
argued in this article, fines should be substituted for prison sentences when
the optimal fine is within the power of the offender to pay. In principle, this
position could, and I think should, be extended beyond the white-collar
domain to include the non-white-collar crimes that the affluent occasionally
commit. The problem is that while some of these crimes, such as murder, are
so serious that even the affluent cannot pay adequate fines, not all whitecollar crimes are less serious than crimes of violence. Nevertheless, the most
serious white-collar crimes are probably committed by corporations rather
than by individuals. Within this corporate category, the gravity of the offense
is probably more or less proportional to the size of the company, so solvency
limitations should not preclude the imposition of very large fines for whitecollar crime where such fines are optimal.
The reference to corporations brings me to the final point that I want to
make in this article. It concerns the case for a different approach to crimes
committed by individuals acting as agents of corporations or other associations rather than acting on their own behalf. There is an argument that I have
25. An intermediate position is that the fact of conviction has a moral effect which can, however, be
impaired if the criminal label is attached to conduct that the community does not regard as morally
reprehensible. See Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Economic
Regulations, 30 U. CM. L. REV. 423 (1963). The problem with this position is that it implies that the stigma
derives from community opinion rather than from the denomination of conduct as criminal. If so, then
logically there is no stigmatizing effect of conviction to be blunted.
26. See Landes & Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1975). In some cases,
primarily where the probability of detection and punishment of a wrongful act is near unity without much
investment in detection and punishment, such as breach of contract, the optimal "penalty" will be simple
damages.
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made elsewhere in the antitrust context for confining criminal (or civilpenalty) liability to the corporation, on the theory that if it is liable it will find
adequate ways of imposing on its employees the costs to it of violating the
law. 27 Of course, this assumes the existence of an adequate set of sanctions,
capable of hurting the corporation for its violations of the law. Perhaps this is
too quixotic an assumption or aspiration (outside of the antitrust context) to
support so radical a proposal. I mention it only to make clear that the
adoption of such a proposal would still leave a wide area in which one would
want to retain criminal or civil-penalty sanctions for white-collar crime as I
have defined it; for not all white-collar crimes are the work of corporations-and in the area of income tax, for example, not most. But wherever
and for whatever reason it is decided to retain criminal sanctions for
individual white-collar offenders, the movement should be toward the
abolition of imprisonment and the substitution of fines-albeit fines more
severe than those today meted out to such offenders.
27. See R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 225-26(1976).
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